7th November 1955 The Freudian Thing, 15th June 1955 Seminar II, & references, Section 2 of ‘Me the truth, I speak’ 19th June 1968 – provenance & ambiguities : 2nd September 2026 : Julia Evans

P163 of Staferla, http://staferla.free.fr /Séminaire 15

19.6.68 p7 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation (www.LacaninIreland.com)

P9 of Anthony Chadwick’s translation, www.Freud2Lacan.com,

Il y a un mot que j’ai fait rentrer ici il y a quelques années dans cette dialectique, c’est le mot « vérité ».

Et puis à vrai dire avant de l’articuler précisément comme je l’ai fait ici un certain jour...

et comme en porte la marque parfaitement logicisée l’article qui s’appelle dans mes Écrits : La vérité et la science [120]

...j’avais donné à ce mot une autre fonction, dans un article qui s’appelle La chose freudienne [121], où on peut lire ces termes :

« Moi la vérité, je parle. » [Écrits, Seuil, 1966, p.409].

Qui est ce « je » qui parle ?

[JE: Who is this ‘I’ which speaks?]

There is a word that I brought in here a few years ago, into this dialectic. It is the word truth.

And then, in truth, before articulating it precisely as I did here on a particular day,

the perfectly logical mark of the article Truth and Science[i], in my Écrits bears witness to,

I had given to the word another function, in an article called The Freudian Things[ii], where one can read these terms:

‘Me the truth, I speak.’

Who? The I that is speaking?

There is a word that I brought back here a few years ago, it’s the word “truth”.

And then, to tell the truth, before articulating precisely as I did here one day

and as carries the perfectly digitised mark the article which is called in my Écrits “Truth and Science”,

I had given to this word another function in an article called “La chose freudienne” where one can read these terms:

“I the truth speak”.

Who? this I who speaks?

Écrits (1966) p 408-409, p8—9 of www.Freud2Lacan.com

P121 of Alan Sheridan’s translation, p8—9 of www.Freud2Lacan.com

P340 of Bruce Fink’s translation, Complete Écrits (2002)

La chose parle d'elle-même.

The thing speaks of itself [JE, could be

The thing speaks from itself].

The Thing Speaks of Itself

[could be

The Thing speaks from itself

Mais voici que la vérité dans la bouche de Freud prend la dite bête aux cornes : «Je suis donc pour vous l'énigme de celle qui se dérobe aussitôt qu'apparue, hommes qui tant vous entendez à me dissimuler sous les oripeaux de vos convenances. Je n'en admets pas moins que votre embarras soit sincère, car même quand vous vous faites mes hérauts, vous ne valez pas plus à porter mes couleurs que ces habits qui sont les vôtres et pareils à vous-mêmes, fantômes que vous êtes. Où vais-je donc passée en vous, où étais-je avant ce passage? Peut-être un jour vous le dirai-je? Mais pour que vous me trouviez où je suis, je vais vous apprendre à quel signe me reconnaître. Hommes, écoutez, je vous en donne le secret. Moi la vérité, je parle.

But the truth in Freud's mouth takes the said beast by the horns: "So for you I am the enigma of her who vanishes as soon as she appears, men who try so hard to hide me under the tawdry finery of your proprieties! But I am prepared to believe that your embarrassment is sincere, for even when you take it upon yourselves to serve as my heralds, you place no greater value on tearing my colours than your own, which are like you yourselves, phantoms that you are. Where, then, will I pass into you? Where was I before I entered you? Perhaps one day I will tell you? But so that you will find me where I am, I will teach you by what sign you will recognize me. Men, listen, I am giving you the secret. [JE] Me the truth, I speak. [Alan Sheridan] I, truth, will speak.

But now the truth in Freud's mouth takes the said bull [bete] by the horns: "To you I am thus the enigma of she who slips away as soon as she appears, you men who try so hard to hide me under the tawdry finery of your proprieties. Still, I admit your embarrassment is sincere, for even when you take it upon yourselves to become my heralds, you acquire no greater worth by wearing my colours than your own clothes, which are like you, phantoms that you are. Where am I going, having passed into you? And where was I prior to that? Will I perhaps tell you someday? But so that you will find me where I am, I will teach you by what sign you can recognize me. Men, listen, I am telling you the secret. [JE] Me the truth, I speak. [Bruce Fink] I, truth, speak.

p410-411 of Écrits 1966, P10-11 of Freud2Lacan,

The Freudian Thing, P10-11 of Freud2Lacan, p122-123 of Alan Sheridan’s translation

Bruce Fink’s translation (2002) p342

« Vous pouvez donc réduire le trafic sur les voies que vous vous épuisâtes à faire rayonner de la conscience, et qui faisaient l'orgueil du moi, couronné par Fichte des insignes de sa transcendance. Le commerce au long cours de la verité ne passe plus par la pensée : chose étrange, il semble que ce soit désormais par les choses : rébus, c'est par vous que je communique, comme Freud le formule à la fin du premier paragraphe du sixième chapitre, consacré au travail du rêve, de son travail sur le rêve et sur ce que le rêve veut dire.

'So you can reduce the traffic on the roads that you strive so hard to radiate from the consciousness, and which constitute the pride of the ego(i), crowned by Fichte with the emblems of transcendence. The trade route of truth no longer passes through thought: strange to say, it now seems to pass through things: riddle, it is through you that I communicate, as Freud formulates it at the end of the first paragraph of the sixth chapter[ii], devoted to the work of the dream, of his work on dreams and what dreams mean.

"You can therefore reduce the traffic on the roads that you strove so hard to prove radiate from consciousness, and which were the ego's pride and joy, crowned by Fichte with the insignias of its transcendence. The long-term trade in truth no longer involves thought; strangely enough, it now seems to involve things: rebus, it is through you that I communicate, as Freud formulates it at the end of the first paragraph of the sixth chapter, devoted to the dreamwork, of his work on dreams and what dreams mean.

... Entendez bien ce qu'il (Freud) a dit, et, comme il l'a dit de moi, la vérité qui parle, le mieux pour le bien saisir est de le prendre au pied de la lettre. Sans doute ici les choses sont mes signes, mais je vous le redis, signes de ma parole.

... Listen carefully to what he (Freud) says, and, as he said from me, the truth that speaks, the better for to grasp it and to take it literally. Here, no doubt, things are my signs, but, I repeat, signs of my speech.

...Listen carefully to what he (Freud) says, and-as he said it Of me(ii), the truth that speaks-the best way to grasp it is to take it quite literally. Here no, doubt, things are my signs, but, I repeat, signs of my speech.

Écrits 1966 p412-413, The Freudian Thing

Alan Sheridan’s translation 1977 p124-125

Bruce Fink’s translation 2002 p343-344

Translation from Linguée, 10th October 2026

Pour mesurer ce déchirement, il faut entendre les clameurs irrépressibles qui s'élèvent des meilleurs comme des pires, à tenter de les ramener au départ de la chasse, avec les mots que la vérité nous y donna pour viatique : « Je parle », pour enchaîner : « Il n'est parole que de langage ». Leur tumulte couvre la suite.

In order to appreciate the scope of this split we must hear the irrepressible cries that arise from the best as well as the worst, attempting to bring them back to the beginning of the chase, with the words that truth has given us as viaticum: 'I speak', adding: 'There is no other speech but language?' The rest is drowned in their tumult.

To gauge the extent of this rending we must hear the irrepressible protests that arise from both the best and the worst, when one tries to bring them back to the beginning of the hunt, with the words that truth gave us as a viaticum—'I speak’—adding, ‘There is no speech without language.’ Their tumult drowns out what follows.

To gauge the depth of this rift, one must listen to the irrepressible clamour rising from both the best and the worst, as they attempt to lead us back to the start of the hunt, with the words that truth gave us as a provision for the journey: ‘I speak’, in order to shackle: ‘There is speech [parole] only from language’. (i) Their clamour drowns out what follows.

«Logomachiel telle est la strophe d'un côté. Que faites-vous du préverbal, du geste et de la mimique, du ton, de l'air de la chanson, de l'humeur et du con-tact af-fec-tif? » A quoi d'autres non moins animés donnent l'antistrophe : « Tout est langage : langage que mon cœur qui bat plus fort quand la venette me saisit, et si ma patiente défaille au vrombissement d'un avion à son zénith, c'est pour dire le souvenir qu'elle a gardé du dernier bombardement ». - Oui, aigle de la pensée, et quand la forme de l'avion découpe ta semblance dans le pinceau perçant la nuit du projecteur, c'est la réponse du ciel.

Logomachia!' goes the strophe on one side. 'What are you doing with the preverbal, gesture and mime, tone, the tune of a song, mood and af-fec-tive con-tact?' To which others no less animated give the antistrophe: 'Everything is language: language when my heart beats faster when I'm in a funk, and if my patient flinches at the throbbing of an aeroplane at its zenith it is a way of saying how she remembers the

last bomb attack?' - Yes, eagle of thought, and when the plane's shape cuts out your likeness in the night-piercing brush of the searchlight, it is the sky’s answer

Logomachia!” goes the strophe on one side. “What do you make of the preverbal, gestures and facial expressions, tone, melody, mood, and af-fec-tive con-tact?” To which others, no less vehement, give the antistrophe: “Everything is language: Language when my hearts beats faster as fear strikes and, if my patient faints at the roar of an airplane at its zenith, it is a way of telling me the memory she still has of the last bombing.” Yes, eagle of thought, and when the plane’s shape cuts out your semblance in the night-piercing beam of the searchlight, it is heaven’s response.

‘Logomachiel – that is the strophe on one side. What of the pre-verbal elements, the gestures and facial expressions, the tone, the mood of the song, the sentiment and the em-o-tional con-tact?’ To which others, no less animated, respond with the antistrophe: ‘Everything is language: language, such as my heart beating faster when a sudden pang seizes me; and if my patient faints at the roar of an aeroplane at its zenith, it is to express the memory she has retained of the last bombing raid’. - Yes, eagle of thought, and when the shape of the aeroplane cuts your image from the beam of light piercing the night, that is the sky’s answer.

On ne contestait pourtant, à s'essayer à ces prémisses, l'usage d'aucune forme de communication à quoi quiconque pût recourir en ses exploits, ni les signaux, ni les images, et fonds ni forme, aucun non plus qu'aucune, ce fonds fût-il un fonds de sympathie,

et la vertu n'étant pas discutée d'aucune bonne forme.

Yet one did not challenge, in dealing with these premises, the use of any form of communication to which anyone might have recourse in his exploits, whether signals or images, content or form, if this content is a content of sympathy, and virtue is not discussed by good form.

Yet, in trying out these premises, people did not challenge the use of any of the forms of communication people might resort to in their exploits, neither signals nor images, content nor form, whether man or woman, even if this content were one of sympathy, the virtue of any proper form not being debated.

Yet, in considering these premises, no one disputed the use of any form of communication to which anyone might resort in their endeavours—neither signals nor images, nor substance nor form—none more than any other, even if that substance were one of sympathy,

and virtue being beyond question in any proper form.

P263 Staferla, Unedited original transcript, 15th June 1955, Seminar II

Translated via Linguée 19th October 2026, 15th June 1955

P281 Sylvana Tomacelli’s translation from edited text, 15th June 1955

...Lacan - Ils ont tous les trois compris quelque chose. Ce qu’ils ont compris est ce qui les intéresse chacun au plus haut point. Vous voyez le sens de cet apologue ? Est-ce que vous croyez que ce phénomène, dont vous voyez bien le caractère  justement exemplaire, à savoir que c’est ce qui se passe tout le temps, en toute occasion, chaque fois que nous nous livrons à un discours intime ou public, est du côté du langage ou du côté de la parole ?

Wladimir GRANOFF - Où est votre question ?

LACAN - Cette petite histoire illustre-t-elle le langage ou la parole ?

Collette AUDRY - Les deux, il y a langage d’un côté et parole de l’autre.

Lacan, All three of them understood something. What they understood is what interests each of them the most. Do you see the meaning of this parable? Do you believe that this phenomenon—the exemplary nature of which you can clearly see, namely that it happens all the time, on every occasion, whenever we engage in private or public discourse—lies on the side of language or on the side of word/speech [la parole]?

Wladimir GRANOFF (i) - Where is your question?

LACAN - Does this short story illustrate language or speech [parole]?

Collette AUDRY (ii)  - Both, on the one side there is language, and on the other, speech [parole].

TEXT Omitted

[Lacan] That is what happens every time we engage in private or public discourse.

[Granoff omitted]

[Lacan] Does this short story illustrate language or speech?

MME AUDRY: Both.

P265-266 Staferla, Original unedited transcript, 15th June 1955, Seminar II

Translated by Linguée, 19th October 2026, 15th June 1955

P282-283 of Sylvana Tomaselli’s translation, edited published text, 15th June 1955

LACAN

J’appelai à la rescousse le Père BEIRNAERT(i) car il y a quand même l’« in principio erat verbum » [Εν αρχη ην ο Λογος]. L’autre jour - vous n’étiez pas là et je l’ai regretté - j’ai trouvé la confirmation dans PLAUTE (ii) de l’emploi du mot fides, que vous avez dit un jour être ce qui pour vous traduisait le mieux la parole. C’est curieux que la traduction religieuse ne dise pas in principio erat fides, mais in principio erat verbum et verbum c’est le langage à proprement parler, c’est le même mot.

LACAN

I called on Father BEIRNAERT(i) for help, because there is, after all, the “in principio erat verbum” [Εν αρχη ην ο Λογος]. The other day—you weren’t there, and I regretted it—I found confirmation in PLAUTUS (ii) of the use of the word fides, which you once said one day to be that which, for you translated speech/logos [la parole] the best. It’s curious that the religious translation does not say *in principio erat fides*, but rather *in principio erat verbum*—and *verbum* is language in the strict sense; it’s the same word.

Lacan

I appealed to Father Beirnaert for help. because of the in principio erat verbum.

One day you said that fides was in your opinion the best translation for speech.

It is odd that the religious translation doesn't say ‘in principio erat fides’. ‘Verbum’, that's language. and even the word.

Elle ne dit pas au commencement était la parole. Quand elle dit qu’au commencement était le mot, elle dit quelque chose qui a un certain sens et qui probablement nous indique qu’il y a là quelque chose, puisqu’on dit que c’était au principe que nous ne pouvons pas atteindre qui nous est à la vérité fort difficilement pensable, car ça ne veut rien dire d’autre que ce qui est également souligné dans le texte grec : « Εν αρχη ην ο Λογος »(iii), Λογος : le langage et non pas la parole. Et après ça, Dieu fait usage de la parole. Il dit « Que la lumière soit. »

Reprenons ce que nous visions tout à l’heure dans cet apologue Wells-ien (iv). La question a son sens, et on conçoit que les uns et les autres la reçoivent de façon différente. Mais enfin, si nous donnons un sens précis au mot parole, qui est cette question qui reste ouverte - qui n’est pas celle que nous devons approcher aujourd’hui- essayons d’approcher de plus près la façon dont l’homme s’intéresse - au sens le plus « inter-esse »(v) - à la parole.

It does not say, “In the beginning was the Word [la parole (logos)].” When it says that “in the beginning was the word [le mot],” it is saying something that has a certain sense and that probably indicates to us that there is something there, since it is said that it was at the beginning—a point we cannot reach—which is, in truth, very difficult for us to conceive, for it means nothing other than what is also emphasised in the Greek text: “Εν αρχη ην ο Λογος” (iii), Λογος: language, not word/speech. And after that, God makes use of the speech/word [parole]. He says, “Let there be light.”

Let’s return to what we were discussing earlier in that Wells-ian apologue (iv). The question has its sense, and one understands that the Ones and the Others interpret it in different ways. But ultimately, if we give a precise sense to the word “speech/logos [parole]”—which is a question that remains open, and one we need not address today—let us try to take a closer look at the way in which humans take an interest—in the most “inter-es(t)” [inter-esse] sense (v)—in the speech/logos [parole].

In the Greek text, logos is also language. and not speech. After that. God made use of speech – ‘Let there be light,’ he said.

Let's try to get a little closer to the manner in which man comes into [s'interesse], in the sense of inter-esse, speech.

Nous éprouvons tout de même bien la nécessité de distinguer ce qui est message - au sens de ce qui est signe, un signe en promenade - et la façon dont l’homme entre dans le coup. Je dis qu’il est lui-même intégré au discours universel. Vous vous apercevez même que ce n’est tout de même pas de la même façon que ces messages dans des bouteilles ou sur des crânes qui se promènent à travers le monde. Ce n’est pas du même ordre, en tout cas pour nous. D’un point de vue de Sirius peut-être (vi), on peut faire une confusion, mais pour nous il n’y en a pas de possible. En tout cas, ce qui nous intéresse est de savoir la différence.

We do, however, keenly feel the need to distinguish between what is a message—in the sense of a sign, a sign on the move—and the way in which man becomes part of the process. I’m saying that he himself is integrated into the universal discourse. You can even see that this is not, after all, the same as those messages in bottles or on skulls that wander across the world. It is not of the same order—at least not for us. From the point of view of Sirius (vi), perhaps, one might confuse the two, but for us, there is no possibility of confusion. In any case, what interests [intéresse] us is understanding the difference.

We certainly feel the necessity of distinguishing between a message. in the sense of sign, a wandering sign, and the manner in which man gets in on it. If he is himself integrated into the universal discourse,

it isn't after all in the same way as the messages which wander the world in bottles or on scalps.

From the point of view of Sirius. Maybe they are the same, but for us that's not possible.

In any case, what concerns us is to know the difference.

C’est pour ça que VALABREGA(viii) tout à l’heure a dit formellement que dans l’apologue de WELLS il s’agit de la parole.

It is for that, that VALABREGA(viii) stated explicitly earlier that WELLS’s apologue acts by itself [il s’agit] from the speech/logos [la parole].

p267 Staferla, from the original transcript of 15th June 1955, Seminar II

Translated by Linguée, 15th October 2026, 15th June 1955, Seminar II

P284 Translated by Sylvana Tomaselli (1988), 15th June 1955

LACAN

Ce qui lui donne sa signification est le moment où nous arrêtons la machine. En d’autres termes, ce qui lui donne sa signification, ce sont les coupures temporelles que nous y faisons, vous l’avez dit vous-même, qui d’ailleurs, si elles sont fautives, peuvent y introduire des ambiguïtés parfois difficiles à résoudre, mais auxquelles on finira toujours par donner une signification.

LACAN

What gives it its meaning [signification] is the moment when we stop the machine. In other words, what gives it its meaning are the temporal breaks we introduce into it – as you yourself said – which, incidentally, if they are incorrect, can introduce ambiguities(i) that are sometimes difficult to resolve, but to which we will always eventually assign a meaning.

Lacan

What gives it its signification is the moment when we stop the machine. These are the temporal breaks which we make in it. If they are faulty, we will see ambiguities emerge, which are sometimes difficult to resolve, but which one will always end up giving a signification to.

P273-274 Staferla, downloaded 15th October 2026, 15th June 1955

Translated by Linguée, 15th October 2026, 15th June 1955, Seminar II

P291 Translated by Sylvana Tomaselli (1988), 15th June 1955

Serge LECLAIRE

Il y a une chose qui me trouble dans tout cela. Était-ce une erreur, mais vous avez traduit tout à l’heure « Au commencement était le langage ». Et c’est la première fois que j’entends cela. C’est ainsi que vous l’entendez. C’est « Au commencement était la parole », ou le verbe, et vous avez dit : « Au commencement était le langage » ? Mais à quoi vous rapportez-vous ? C’est la traduction que vous donnez ?

LACAN - In principio erat verbum, c’est incontestablement le langage, ce n’est pas la parole.

Serge LECLAIRE- Alors, il n’y a pas de commencement.

LACAN - Mais ce n’est pas moi qui ai écrit l’Évangile selon Saint Jean.

Serge LECLAIRE - C’est la première fois que je vois cela. On écrit toujours la parole, ou le verbe, et jamais le langage.

LACAN Je vous ai déjà écrit deux fois au tableau le distique dont personne ne m’a demandé l’explication:

Indem er alles schaft, was schaftet der hôchste ? - Sich.

Was schaft er aber vor er alles schaftet ? - Mich. [i]

Que faisait le Tout-Puissant au moment où il a fait la création ? - Sich : soi-même.

Qu’est-ce qui était avant qu’il fasse quoi que ce soit? - Mich : moi-même.

C’est évidemment une affirmation hasardée, mais qui vise probablement quelque chose.

Serge LECLAIRE - Je ne comprends pas pourquoi vous traduisez au commencement et non pas avant le commencement.

LACAN  Je ne suis pas du tout en train de vous dire que Saint JEAN a écrit les choses correctement.

Je vous dis que dans Saint JEAN il y a : in principio erat verbum, en latin. Vous l’avez vu quand nous avons traduit le De significatione, je n’aurais pas eu à demander au père BEIRNAERT comment il aurait pu signifier la parole.

Il a bien fait quelques trouvailles, mais pas une seule qui nous satisfaisait.

LECLAIRE (i) There’s one thing that troubles me about all this. Perhaps I’m mistaken, but a moment ago you translated it as ‘In the beginning was language’. And that’s the first time I’ve heard that. Is that how you understand it? It’s ‘In the beginning was the word/speech [parole]’, or the Verb, and you said, ‘In the beginning was language’? But what are you referring to? Is that the translation you’re giving?

LACAN – In principio erat verbum: this is unquestionably language, not speech/word [parole].

Serge LECLAIRE – So, there is no beginning.

LACAN – But I wasn’t the one who wrote the Gospel according to Saint John.

Serge LECLAIRE – That’s the first time I’ve come across that. We always write ‘the word/speech’ or ‘the verb’, and never ‘language’.

LACAN I have already written the couplet on the blackboard twice, and no one has asked me to explain it:

Indem er alles schaft, was schaftet der hôchste? - Sich.

Was schaft er aber vor er alles schaftet? - Mich.[ii]

Was He powerful at the moment He created the world? – Sich: oneself.

What was there before He did anything? – Mich: myself.

This is obviously an emboldened claim, but which probably targets something.

Serge LECLAIRE – I don’t understand why you translate ‘in the beginning’ rather than ‘before the beginning’.

LACAN  I am by no means telling you that Saint John wrote things correctly. What I am saying is that in Saint John there is: ‘in principio erat verbum’, in Latin. You saw this when we translated the *De significatione*[iii]; I wouldn’t have had to ask Father Beirnaert how he might have rendered the word.  He did come up with a few ideas, but not a single one that satisfied us.[iv]

DR LECLAIRE: There is something which troubles me in all this. Earlier on you translated in the beginning was language, and that is the first time I've heard that. What are; you referring to? Is this your translation?

LACAN ‘In principio erat verbum’, that is undeniably language, it isn't speech .

DR LECLAIRE: So there is no beginning.

LACAN I didn't write the Gospel according to St John.

DR LECLAIRE: That's the first time I've ever seen this. One always writes speech, or the word [verbe], and never language.

LACAN I have already written the distich up twice on the blackboard and nobody has asked me

for the explanation.

Indem er alles schaft, was schaftet der Hochste? - Sich.

Was schaft er aber vor er alles schaftet? - Mich.

What was the Almighty doing when he made the creation? - Sich, himself.

And what was he before he made anything at all? Mich, myself.

It is obviously a risky affirmation.

DR LECLAIRE: I don't understand why you translate in the beginning, and not before the beginning.

LACAN: I'm not at all engaged in telling you that St John wrote things correctly. I am saying that, in St John, there's in ‘principio erat verbum’, in Latin. Now, as you saw when we translated the De significatione, verbum means word, the signifier, and not speech.

Écrits 1966 p413-414, The Freudian Thing

Alan Sheridan’s translation 1977 p125

Bruce Fink’s translation 2002 p344

Translation by Linguée, 13th October 2026

On se prenait seulement à répéter après Freud le mot de sa découverte : ça parle, et là sans doute où l'on s'y attendait le moins, là où ça souffre. S'il fut un temps où il suffisait pour y répondre d'écouter ce que ça disait, (car à l'entendre la réponse y est déjà), tenons donc que les grands des origines, les géants du fauteuil furent frappés de la malédiction promise aux audaces titanesques, ou que leurs sièges cessèrent d'être conducteurs de la bonne parole dont ils se trouvaient investis à s'y asseoir ci-devant. Quoi qu'il en soit, depuis, entre le psychanalyste et la psychanalyse, on multiplie les rencontres dans l'espoir que l'Athénien s'atteigne avec l'Athéna sortie couverte de ses armes du cerveau de Freud. Dirai-je le sort jaloux, toujours pareil, qui contraria ces rendez-vous : sous le masque où chacun devait rencontrer sa promise, hélas! trois fois hélas! et cri d'horreur à y penser, une autre ayant pris la place d'elle, celui qui était là, non plus n'était pas lui.

One began only to repeat after Freud the word of his discovery: it speaks,  and, no doubt, where it is least expected, namely, where there is pain. If there ever was a time when simply listening to what it said was sufficient reply (for hearing it is already a reply), let us suppose therefore that the great ones of the early days, the arm-chair giants, were struck by the curse destined to titanic acts of daring, or that their seats ceased to be conductors of the good speech before which they were expected to sit. However, since then, the meetings between the psychoanalyst and psychoanalysis have increased in the hope that the Athenian could be reached with Athene having emerged fully armed from the head of Freud. Shall I tell you of the jealous fate, ever the same, that thwarted these meetings: beneath the mask in which everyone was to meet his promised, alas! thrice alas! and a cry of horror at the thought of it, another having taken her place, he who was there was not he either.

They began merely to repeat after Freud the key to his discovery: it [ça] speaks, precisely where it was least expected—namely, where it suffers. If there ever was a time when, to respond to it, it sufficed to listen to what it was saying

(for the answer is already there in hearing it), let us assume that the great ones of the early days, the armchair giants, were struck by the curse that befalls titanic acts of daring, or that their chairs ceased to be conductors of the good word which they were vested to sit before. Be that as it may, since then, there have been more meetings between the psychoanalyst and psychoanalysis in the hope that the Athenian would reach his apex with Athena having emerged fully armed from Freud’s head. Shall I tell you of the jealous fate, every the same that thwarted these meetings? Behind the mask where each of us was to meet his betrothed-alas! Thrice alas! And a cry of horror at the thought of it, another woman having taken her place-he who was there was not him either.

We found ourselves merely repeating, after Freud, the words of his discovery: “Id speaks”[i]—and there, no doubt, where we least expected it, where Id hurts.[ii] If there was a time when it was enough in order to respond from listening to what “id” said (for, upon hearing it, the answer is already there), let us then assume that the great figures of the past, the giants of the armchair, were struck by the curse reserved for titanic audacity, or that their seats ceased to be conduits of the good speech/word/logos [parole] with which they had previously been entrusted when they sat there hereto in front. Be that as it may, since then, there have been numerous encounters between the psychoanalyst and psychoanalysis, in the hope that the Athenian might come face to face with the Athena who emerged, clad in her armour, from Freud’s mind [iii]. Shall I speak of the jealous fate, ever the same, which thwarted these meetings: beneath the mask where each was to meet their betrothed, alas! three times alas! and a cry of horror at the very thought, another had taken her place, and the one who was there was, once again, not him.

Revenons donc posément à épeler avec la vérité ce qu'elle a dit d'elle-même. La vérité a dit : « Je parle ». Pour que nous reconnaissions ce « je » à ce qu'il parle, peut-être n'était-ce pas sur le « je » qu'il fallait nous jeter, mais aux arêtes du parler que nous devions nous arrêter. « Il n'est parole que de langage» nous rappelle que le langage est un ordre que des lois constituent, desquelles nous pourrions apprendre au moins ce qu'elles excluent. Par exemple que le langage, c'est différent de l'expression naturelle et que ce n'est pas non plus un code; que ça ne se confond pas avec l'information, collez-vous-y pour le savoir à la cybernétique; et que c'est si peu réductible à une superstructure qu'on vit le matétialisme lui-même s'alarmer de cette hérésie, bulle de Staline à voir ici.

Let us return, then, quite deliberately, and with the truth spell out what it has said of itself. The truth has said: ‘I speak’. To recognize this ‘I’ by what he speaks, perhaps we should not have turned to the ‘I’, but paused at the angle of intersection of the speech. ‘There is no speech that is not language' reminds us that language is an order constituted by laws, of which we might at least learn what they exclude. For example, that language is different from natural expression and that it is not a code either; that it is not to be confused with information – and don’t forget it when you are dealing with cybernetics; and that it is so irreducible to a superstructure that materialism itself is seen to be alarmed by this heresy – see Stalin’s bull[c] on the question.

Let us thus calmly return and spell out with the truth what it said of itself. The truth said, “I speak.” In order for us to recognize this “I” on the basis of the fact that it speaks, perhaps we should not have jumped on the “I,” but should have paused at the facets of the speaking. “There is no speech without language” reminds us that language is an order constituted by laws, about which we could at least learn what they exclude. For example, that language is different from natural expression and that it is not a code either; that language is not the same as information-take a close look at cybernetics and you’ll see the difference; and that language is so far from being reducible to a superstructure that materialism itself was alarmed by this heresy-see Stalin’s pronouncement on the question.

Let us therefore calmly return to spelling out, in truth, what she said about herself. The truth said: ‘I speak’. In order for us to recognise this ‘I’ in what it speaks, perhaps it was not the ‘I’ itself that we ought to have focused on, but rather the contours of speech that we should have examined. ‘There is speech/word [parole] only from language’ reminds us that language is an order constituted by laws, from which we might at least learn what they exclude. For example, that language is different from natural expression and is not a code either; that it should not be confused with information – look into cybernetics to find out more; and that it is so far from being reducible to a superstructure that even materialism itself is alarmed by this heresy – see Stalin’s Bull[iv] here.

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Sigmund Freud, Studienausgabe Band IX, p245-246

Modified translation, JE, 21st October 2026, with help from Linguée

Section VI, SE XXI p117-118, translated by James Strachey, www.Freud2Lacan.com

Es wird sich zeigen, daB dem nicht so ist, daB es sich bloB darum handelt, eine Wendung, die langst vollzogen worden ist, scharfer zu fassen und in ihre Konsequenzen zu verfolgen. Von allen langsam entwickelten Stiicken der analytischen Theorie hat sich die Trieblehre am miihseligsten vorwarts getastet. Und sie war doch dem Ganzen so unentbehrlich, daB irgend etwas an ihre Stelle geriickt werden muBte. In der vollen Ratlosigkeit der Anfange gab mir der Satz des Dichterphilosophen Schiller den ersten Anhalt, daB »Hunger und Liebe« das Getriebe der Welt zusammenhalten [1]• Der Hunger konnte als Vertreter jener Triebe gelten, die das Einzelwesen erhalten wollen, die Liebe strebt nach Objekten; ihre Hauptfunktion, von der Natur in jeder Weise begiinstigt, ist die Erhaltung der Art. So traten zuerst Ichtriebe und Objekttriebe einander gegeniiber. Fiir die Energie der letzteren, und ausschlieBlich fiir sie, fiihrte ich den Namen Libido ein [2] ; somit lief der Gegensatz zwischen den Ichtrieben und den aufs Objekt gerichteten »libidinosen« Trieben der Liebe im weitesten Sinne [3]• Einer von diesen Objekttrieben, der sadistische, tat sich zwar dadurch hervor, daB sein Ziel so gar nicht liebevoll war, auch schloB er sich offenbar in manchen Stiicken den Ichtrieben an, konnte seine nahe Verwandtschaft mit Bemachtigungstrieben ohne libidinose Absicht nicht verbergen, aber man kam iiber diese Unstimmigkeit hinweg; der Sadismus gehorte doch offenbar zum Sexualleben, das grausame Spiel konnte das zartliche ersetzen. Die Neurose erschien als der Ausgang eines Kampfes zwischen dem lnteresse der Selbstbewahrung und den Anforderungen der Libido, ein Kampf, in dem das Ich gesiegt hatte, aber um den Preis Schwerer Leiden und Verzichte.

It remains to be seen whether this is not the case—whether it is merely a matter of articulating more clearly a shift that has long since taken place and tracing its consequences. Of all the areas of analytical theory that have developed slowly, the theory of drives has made the most painstaking progress. And yet it was so indispensable to the whole that something had to be put in its place. In the utter bewilderment of those early days, a phrase by the poet-philosopher Schiller gave me my first clue that ‘hunger and love’ are the forces that hold the world together. [2] Hunger could be regarded as representative of those drives that seek to preserve the individual; love, on the other hand, seeks objects; its primary function, which nature has favoured in every way, is the preservation of the species. Thus, the ego drive and the object drive were initially set in opposition to one another. I introduced the term ‘libido’ to denote the energy of the latter, and exclusively for that purpose [3]; Thus, the contrast between the ‘ego’ drives and those directed at the object, the ‘libidinal’ drives of love in the broadest sense. [4] One of these object drives, the sadistic one, did indeed stand out in that its goal was by no means loving; indeed, in some respects it evidently aligned itself with the ego drives, yet it could not conceal its close kinship with power drives devoid of libidinal intent, but this inconsistency was overlooked;  after all, sadism was clearly part of their sex life, this cruel game could take the place of tenderness.  Neurosis appeared to be the outcome of a struggle between the drive for self-preservation and the demands of the libido, a struggle in which the ego/I had triumphed, but at the cost of severe suffering and sacrifice.

We shall see, however, that this is not so and that it is merely a matter of bringing into sharper focus a tum of thought arrived at long ago and of following out its consequences. Of all the slowly developed parts of analytic theory, the theory of the drives is the one that has felt its way the most painfully forward.[1] And yet that theory was so indispensable to the whole structure that something had to be put in its place. In what was at first my utter perplexity, I took as my starting-point a saying of the poet-philosopher, Schiller, that ‘hunger and love are what moves the world’. [2] Hunger could be taken to represent the instincts which aim at preserving the individual; while love strives after objects, and its chief function, favoured in every way by nature, is the preservation of the species. Thus, to begin with, ego-instincts and object-instincts confronted each other. It was to denote the energy of the latter and only the latter instincts that I introduced the term ‘libido’.[3] Thus the antithesis was between the ego-instincts and the ‘libidinal’ instincts of love (in its widest sense [4]) which were directed to an object.   One of these object-instincts, the sadistic instinct, stood out from the rest, it is true, in that its aim was so very far from being loving. Moreover, it was obviously in some respects attached to the ego-instincts: it could not hide its close affinity with instincts of mastery which have no libidinal purpose. But these discrepancies were got over; after all, sadism was clearly a part of sexual life, in the activities of which affection could be replaced by cruelty. Neurosis was regarded as the outcome of a struggle between the interest of self-preservation and the demands of the libido, a struggle in which the ego had been victorious but at the price of severe sufferings and renunciations.

P86 IV. Suggestion und Libido, Freud2Lacan

Translated by James Strachey, SE XVIII p91 

Modifications then translation with Linguée, August 2026

Wir meinen also, daß die Sprache mit dem Wort »Liebe« in seinen vielfaltigen Anwendungen eine durchaus berechtigte Zusammenfassung geschaffen hat und daß wir nichts Besseres tun konnen, als dieselbe auch unseren wissenschaftlichen Erorterungen und Darstellungen zugrunde zu legen. Durch diesen Entschluß hat die Psychoanalyse einen Sturm von Entriistung entfesselt, als ob sie sich einer frevelhaften Neuerung schuldig gemacht hatte. Und doch hat die Psychoanalyse mit dieser »erweiterten« Auffassung der Liebe nichts Originelles geschaff en. Der »Eros« des Philosophen Plato zeigt in seiner Herkunft, Leistung und Beziehung zur Geschlechtsliebe eine vollkommene Deckung mit der Liebeskraft, der Libido der Psychoanalyse, wie Nachmansohn und Pfister im einzelnen dargelegt haben [1], und wenn der Apostel Paulus in dem beriihmten Brief an die Korinther die Liebe über alles andere preist, hat er sie gewiß im namlichen »erweiterten« Sinn verstanden [2], woraus nur zu lernen ist, daß die Menschen ihre großen Denker nicht immer ernst nehmen, auch wenn sie sie angeblich sehr bewundern.

We are of opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justifiable piece of unification in creating the word 'love' with its numerous uses, and that we cannot do better than take it as the basis of our scientific discussions and expositions as well.

By coming to this decision, psycho-analysis has let loose a storm of indignation, as though it had been guilty of an act of outrageous innovation.

Yet it has done nothing original in taking love in this 'wider' sense. In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the 'Eros' of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis,

as has been shown in detail by Nachansohn (1915) and Pfister (1921) ; and when the apostle Paul, in his famous epistle to the Corinthians, praises love above all else, he certainly understands it in the same 'wider' sense.[1]

But this only shows that men do not always take their great thinkers seriously, even when they profess most to admire them.

We therefore believe that, through the word ‘love’ in its manifold uses, language has provided a perfectly valid summary, and that we can do no better than to use it as the basis for our scholarly discussions and expositions.

This decision sparked a storm of indignation against psychoanalysis, as though it were guilty of some sacrilegious innovation.

And yet psychoanalysis has not created anything original with this ‘expanded’ conception of love. The ‘Eros’ of the philosopher Plato, in terms of its origins, nature and relationship to sexual love, corresponds perfectly with the ‘love force’, the libido of psychoanalysis,

as Nachmansohn and Pfister have explained in detail [1], and when the Apostle Paul, in his famous Epistle to the Corinthians, extols love above all else, he certainly understood it in the specific ‘broader’ sense [2],

from this we can only conclude that people do not always take their great thinkers seriously, even if they claim to admire them greatly

Diese Liebestriebe werden nun in der Psychoanalyse a potiori und von ihrer Herkunft her Sexualtriebe geheißen

Psycho-analysis, then, gives these love instincts the name of sexual instincts, a potiori and by reason of their origin.

In psychoanalysis, these love-drives are now termed sexual drives a potiori [i] and on the basis of their origin.